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The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest emissions trading 
scheme to date. This article summarizes the principle elements behind the trading system, and 
details the carbon price dynamics during Phase II (2008-2012), along with an analysis of 
traded volumes.  The main findings emphasize that the EU ETS is a rapidly growing market, 
which  yields  to  innovative  learning  process  for  all  participants  involved:  policy  makers, 
industrial operators, and financial analysts. Besides, these results shed some light on the 
usefulness of credit project mechanisms, which may result in the medium-term in integrated 
‘world’ carbon markets between various regional and/or national ETS. 
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1. Introduction 
When the EU ratified the Kyoto Protocol, it committed itself to reduce Greenhouse Gases 
emissions (GHGs) by 8% during the period 2008-2012 compared to 1990 levels. The EU 
therefore decided to set a ceiling on emissions from around 12,000 industrial installations in 
the most energy-intensive sectors, and to implement an emissions market with the aim of 
reducing  CO2  emissions  and  achieving  the  Kyoto  Protocol  target.  The  European  Union 
Emissions  Trading  Scheme  (EU  ETS)  was  thus  created  by  the  Directive  2003/87/EC  on 
January 1, 2005 with a pilot phase going from 2005 to 2007. We are currently under the Phase 
II of the EU ETS (2008-2012), which has been confirmed until 2020 at least (Phase III goes 
indeed from 2013 to 2020). European Union Allowances (EUAs), which represent the right to 
emit one ton of CO2 in the atmosphere, are traded under this scheme. 
 
By doing so, the EU clearly indicated its will to take the lead in the fight against global 
warming. The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade scheme, which means that the overall level of 
emissions  is  capped  and  up  to  this  limit  participants  are  allowed  to  buy/sell  allowances 
(emissions rights) according to their needs
2. The scheme covers nearly half of the EU’s CO2 
(Carbon Dioxide) emissions, and 40% of the EU’s total GHGs emissions. The EU ETS sets a 
price on carbon, which can be related to market fundamentals such as institutional events, 
weather  events,  other  energy  market  prices’  influences  and  macroeconomic  determinants 
(Alberola et al. (2008), Alberola et al. (2009a,b), Chevallier (2009a)). Phase I was introduced 
as a “warm-up” period from 2005 to 2007 in order to put in place the policy infrastructure of 
permits trading. However, the early environmental benefits were limited because of over-
allocation concerns among Member States (Ellerman and Buchner (2008), Ellerman et al. 
(2010)) and the implementation of banking restrictions between 2007 and 2008 which caused 
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carbon spot prices and futures of maturity December 2007 to plummet towards zero (Alberola 
and Chevallier (2009)). This first experience also highlighted the need for reliable verified 
emissions data, for harmonized monitoring and reporting rules, as well as potential distortions 
of competition between Member States. Despite these problems, Phase I was considered as a 
“success”
3, which fostered various initiatives for ETS schemes around the world. 
 
Once  the  EU  ETS’s  coming  into  force  was  secured,  the  EU  recognized  (under  certain 
conditions) credits issued via flexibility mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol: namely, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) projects. Limits on the import 
of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs
4) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs
5) within the 
EU  trading  system  appeared  rapidly  as  part  of  the  scheme  design  (Trotignon  and  Leguet 
(2009), Chevallier (2010a)). Extensions, concerning the inclusion of additional sectors such as 
aviation and petrochemicals for instance, are expected from 2013 onwards. More details on 
the characteristics of the EU emissions market, including cap and period, the definition of 
emissions rights, allocation, registries, penalties, monitoring and reporting of emissions, may 
be found in Chevallier (2010b). 
 
To reflect on the rapid development of the EU ETS, this article proposes a review of the 
current dynamics in carbon prices, as well as on the volumes exchanged on this market. Our 
central results feature that the EU emissions trading system is rapidly growing, with various 
emissions  rights  being  traded  simultaneously:  spot,  futures,  and  options  prices.  We  also 
                                                 
3 Note the notion of success  may be approximated by  various effects (pre-existing regulatory environment, 
technology innovation and diffusion, reduction of regulatory uncertainty, aggregate cost savings, etc) but we will 
focus on the efficiency of the permits price, i.e. its ability to reflect current information on spot and future prices. 
4 CER means a unit issued pursuant to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. These are tradable units generated by 
projects in non-Annex B Parties under the Clean Development Mechanism. They may be counted by Annex B 
Parties towards compliance with their UN and EU emissions target and are equal to one tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent gases. 
5 ERU is a unit issued pursuant to Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol. These are tradable units generated by projects 
in Annex 1 Parties under Joint Implementation. Annex 1 Parties may count them towards compliance with their 
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highlight the rise of CER credits issued from project mechanisms, which can be used in the 
medium-term to ‘link’ separate regional and/or national emissions trading schemes initatives. 
  
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 details carbon price dynamics 
during Phase II. Section 3 provides an analysis of traded volumes. Section 4 concludes.   
 
2. Price Dynamics 
During Phase I (2005-2007) of the scheme, the demand for allowances did not follow the 
actual  level  of  emissions,  as  documented  by  Ellerman  and  Buchner  (2008).  Between  the 
launch of the market in January 2005 and the first consolidated results of verified emissions in 
April 2006, the carbon price has been rising continuously due to risk-averse behaviours from 
installations in excess of allowances and potentially to speculative activity from brokerage 
firms  and  investment  banks.  Against  this  background,  the  carbon  prices  of  all  maturities 
encountered a dramatic downward shift in April 2006 when the rumours of ‘over-allocation’ 
hit the market a few weeks before the official audit report from the European Commission by 
May 15, 2006.  Carbon prices fell by more than 54% in a few days, as explained by Alberola 
et al.  (2008). Then, due to the banking restrictions implemented between 2007  and 2008 
(essentially not to report excess allowances towards Phase II which coincides with the start of 
the Kyoto Protocol), spot prices and futures prices of maturity December 2007 have been 
decreasing towards zero (Alberola and Chevallier (2009)). 
 
By contrast, Phase II carbon prices present a more stable and healthy price pattern. As shown 
in Table 1, spot allowances exchanged on BlueNext (BNX) have been oscillating between 
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(2009a,b)) due to industrial production, and the likely depressive impact of the credit crunch 
crisis on all commodities markets (Chevallier (2009)). 
 
Figure 1: Price (in €/ton) of EUA Spot Allowances 
Source: BlueNext 
 
As shown in Figures 2 to 4, futures prices of maturities December 2008 to December 2010, 
exchanged on the European Climate Exchange (ECX), also exhibit a relatively stable price 
path.  
 




The December 2008 futures contract has been rising above €35/ton of CO2, and its historical 
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Similarly, the December 2009 futures contract has been increasing to €37 ton of CO2.  Starting 
in October 2008, we can nevertheless notice a delayed effect of the financial crisis on the 
carbon  market,  as  allowance  futures  prices  fell  below  €15/ton  of  CO2. 
 
 




Until present, December 2010 futures prices have been trading in the range of €15 to €25/ton 








































0  7 
In Figures 5 to 7, we look at the CER futures prices of maturity December 2008 to December 
2010 exchanged on ECX. 
 
 




It appears very clearly in Figure 5 that the price path of CER futures prices for the contract 
expiring in December 2008 has been very different from the EUA futures price contract of the 
corresponding maturity. We notice a sharp price difference during the year (above €22 in July 
vs.  below  €15/ton  of  CO2  in  December).  This  figure  reveals  two  different  price  regimes: 
before and after October 2008, which can be related to the transmission of the financial crisis 
to global commodity markets (including the carbon market). CER futures prices therefore 
exhibit a stronger adjustment to the crisis than EUA futures prices. It may be explained by the 
fact that various levels of risks are embedded within CER prices (including the risk of non-
delivery of projects) and also by the fact that CER prices are tradable on a more global scale 
than EUAs (namely within all countries which ratified the Kyoto Protocol) and the crisis may 
have been more severe in other regions compared to Europe (thereby resulting in a relatively 
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Figure 6: Price (in €/ton) and Volume (in ton) of the December 2009 CER Futures Contract 
Source: ECX 
 
In Figure 6, we also notice the strong adjustment in CER futures prices of maturity December 
2009 during the end of the year 2008. The price pattern has been stabilizing in 2009 between 
€10 and €15/ton of CO2. 
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This diagnostic is confirmed in 2010: CER futures prices of maturity December 2010 have 
been traded until present around €12/ton of CO2.  
 
In this section, we have seen that all kinds of carbon prices (spot, futures, credits from project 
mechanisms) are relatively stable in 2010 (in the range of €10 to €15/ton of CO2), awaiting 
for the economic recovery after a period of strong adjustment to the financial crisis during late 
2008. We have also emphasized that these effects are somewhat more pronounced for CERs 
than for EUAs. 
 
In the next section, we complement our analysis of the dynamics of carbon prices with an 
analysis of the volumes traded for each type of contract. 
  
3. Volume Analysis 
In Figure 8, we observe that Phase II BNX spot allowances have been actively traded during 
the period going from January to May 2009, which corresponds to the 2008 compliance event. 
 
 










































0  10 
During  this  period,  installations  need  to  surrender  as  many  allowances  as  the  amount  of 
carbon dioxide emitted during the reference year. Therefore, installations in shortage (excess) 
of allowances with respect to their individual allocation level may purchase (sell) allowances 
on the spot market in order to meet their compliance requirement in the EU ETS (Alberola et 
al. (2008)). A penalty of €100/ton of CO2 occurs if installations do not meet their target.  
 
In Figures 2 to 4, we notice that EUA Futures prices have been traded actively during October 
2008 (when companies were selling allowances for cash in order to cope with the financial 
crisis), February to May 2009 (which also corresponds to the 2008 compliance event in a 
context of decreasing carbon prices), and in February 2010 as well. 
 
Figures 5 to 7 show that CER futures prices have been heavily traded during August 2008 (in 
a context of sharp decrease of CER prices), October to December 2008 (as an adjustment to 
the financial crisis), in October 2009 and in January 2010 as well. We may therefore identify 
similar patterns with the trading of EUA futures. This situation may be explained by the fact 
that  CER  prices  are  discounted  with  a  “risk  premium”  from  EUA  prices  by  market 
participants  due  to  their  higher  level  of  risk  (as  discussed  previously)  and  their  limited 
fungibility within the EU ETS (CER prices may be imported within the EU trading system up 
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Figure 9: Open Interest on EUA Futures Contracts from April 22, 2005 to February 22, 2010 
Source: ECX 
 
Figure 9 provides another interesting piece of information, as it displays the open interest 
available for EUA futures contracts exchanged on ECX. This amount has been continuously 
increasing since 2005. It is currently close to 400 million ton of CO2. We also note that the 
open interest is periodically subject to wide variations (from 50 to 100 million ton), as futures 
contract of a given year expire.  
 
Taken  together,  these  elements  highlight  that  carbon  prices  (be  it  spot,  futures  or  project 
mechanisms) have been rapidly growing since 2005. This trend is confirmed during Phase II. 
Point Carbon analysts estimate that the volume of transactions on the European carbon market 
has been growing from 262 million ton in 2005 to 809 million ton in 2006, 1,455 million ton 
in 2007, 2,713 million ton in 2008, and 5,016 million ton in 2009. These estimates
6 account 
for exchange-based trading as well as over-the-counter trading of emissions rights. 
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Let us now have a look at the options markets for carbon prices, which have been introduced 
by  ECX  in  October  2006  for  EUA  futures  (see  Chevallier  et  al.  (2009)  for  a  detailed 
presentation of the options market) and in May 2008 for CER futures.  
 
Contract  Total Options Volume (in ton) 
ECX Futures December 2008  243,166,000 
ECX Futures December 2009  415,567,000 
ECX Futures December 2010  79,446,000 
CER Futures December 2008  67,800,000 
CER Futures December 2009  91,930,000 
CER Futures December 2010  7,750,000 
 
Table 1: Number and volume of options contracts exchanged on ECX  
Source: ECX 
Note: The statistics are reported for the period going from January 1, 2008 to February 22, 2010 for 
ECX EUA Futures, and from May 16, 2008 to February 2010 for ECX CER Options. 
 
 
Table 1 highlights that the use of options prices has been steadily growing since their creation, 
going from 243 million ton in 2008 to 416 million ton in 2009 for EUA futures, and from 68 
million ton in 2008 to 92 million ton in 2009 for CER futures.   
 
As  for  any  financial  market,  the  emergence  of  liquid  options  markets  constitute  another 
derivative asset that may be used by energy companies, brokers and investment banks in order 
to insure themselves against unwanted price movements. Hence, option prices have the ability 
to reflect various levels of risk-aversion embedded within market participants’ utility function 
(in economic terms). Risk-averse agents will tend to insure themselves against ‘high’ carbon 
price levels (according to their expectations) while risk-lover agents will tend to bet against 
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generate net profits from arbitrage activities. Risk-neutral agents, such as utilities regulated by 
the scheme, may also neutralize the effects of carbon price changes during compliance events 
by buying/selling in advance a pre-determined quantity of carbon prices at a fixed price. 
 
Figure 10: Volumes of EUA Futures Call Option Prices exchanged from January 1, 2008 to 
February 22, 2010 
Source: ECX 
 
Figure 11: Volumes of EUA Futures Put Option Prices exchanged from January 1, 2008 to 
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Figure  12:  Volumes  of  CER  Futures  Call  Option  Prices  exchanged  from  May  16,  2008  to 
February 22, 2010 
Source: ECX 
 
Figure  13:  Volumes  of  CER  Futures  Put  Option  Prices  exchanged  from  May  16,  2008  to 
February 22, 2010 
Source: ECX 
 
Figures 10 to 13 show the amount of call and put option prices exchanged during Phase II for 
EUA  futures  and  CER  futures,  respectively,  on  ECX.  We  document  that  calls  are  more 
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(2009) explain this situation by the fact that the main fear on the carbon market is that prices 
increase. On such a market, the easiest way to hedge again this risk is by selling calls: call 
option prices are therefore more actively traded than puts. 
 
Finally, we document that strike prices range from €10 to €100 for EUA Call Options, and 
from €0.95 to €26 for EUA Put Options. As discussed above, this variability reflects various 
levels of risk-aversion which are embedded within the trading of options prices, and can go as 
high as €100/ton of CO2 for EUA futures. Similarly, strike prices from €10 to €50 for CER 
Call Options, and from €6 to €16 for CER Put Options. The level of uncertainty attached to 
CER options prices also appears quite high in a context of post-Kyoto negotiations (and the 
fact that CERs are not confirmed to be operating after 2013 to date).  
 
4. Conclusion 
The first Phase of the EU ETS has demonstrated the difficulty of ensuring uniform rules and 
limiting over-allocation when it is made by Member States. This specific design problem was 
addressed  –  along  with  many  others  including  provisions  for  new  entrants,  banking 
mechanisms, etc. – with the EU Commission’s more severe review of National Allocation 
Plans. Besides, during 2005-2007, the emissions market lacked the reference data to monitor 
the actual level of emissions and potential purchases/sells on the market among installations. 
The fears of harming competitiveness of businesses also led some Member States to place too 
much  faith  in  expected  benchmark  figures  from  industrials.  During  Phase  II,  the  audited 
figures for each installation are known, and installations that received initially a substantial 
surplus generally received much less during the second phase. 
 
Since  2008,  the  European  carbon  market  and  credits  from  projects  mechanisms  have 
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through  exchanges  and  over-the  counter  transactions  based  on  price  levels,  institutional 
characteristics  of  the  market  (compliance  requirements,  banking  provisions,  etc.), 
fundamentals identified during Phase I (linked to other energy markets prices, weather events, 
economic growth, etc.), and anticipations of the reduced allocation which will be linearly 
enforced through time.  
 
2008 and 2009 have been specific years for carbon markets with the conjunction of unusual 
events: the adjustment to the financial crisis, the delays in post-Kyoto negotiations due to the 
Copenhagen Summit, and various decisions by the EU Commission regarding allocation in 
Eastern European countries. The decrease in carbon prices recorded may be linked to the 
economic crisis, with a price range currently comprised between €10 and €15/ton of CO2 for 
EUA spot, EUA futures, and CER futures prices as well. 
 
Despite these adjustments, this article shows that carbon markets have continued they rapid 
development, by achieving record activity levels since 2005. Our analysis highlighted that 
EUA futures prices tend to be more actively traded than spot allowances, while CER futures 
prices  are  useful  mechanisms  to  ‘link’  carbon  markets  worldwide,  in  a  context  of  rapid 
development of other schemes at the regional and/or national levels. ‘Financial’ fundamentals 
in carbon prices (as opposed to ‘physical’ fundamentals identified during Phase I) may also be 
underlined as being a salient characteristic of Phase II carbon prices, with strong adjustment 
to the financial crisis and new behaviours from installations to sell allowances for cash when 
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